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Credit Markets
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Changes in the credit market over the last 30 years have
expanded access and transformed the way in which households apply for, use, and abuse credit opportunities. Yet the
ramifications of this democratization of credit have been
underexplored within the economics literature. This dissertation investigates three dimensions of the impact that
the credit market has on the labor market, and vice versa. In
doing so, this research develops improved frameworks for
understanding the relationship between labor market choices
made concurrently with borrowing decisions, as well as
provides empirical evidence for these two markets’ interdependence. The essays in this dissertation provide insight into
the interaction between personal bankruptcy and the labor
market, the incentive structure for the issuance of subprime
mortgages, and the decision making behind borrowing
interest-free student loans.

The Credit Market Consequences of
Job Displacement
More than one million households file for bankruptcy
each year. The system is designed to help households that are
unable to repay their debts regain control of their finances.
By limiting the risk associated with borrowing, however,
bankruptcy laws create an incentive for individuals to
increase their debt. This tension between the desire to give
households a “fresh start” and the moral hazard therein has
been a central point of conflict in the politics of bankruptcy
reform and in the present academic research on bankruptcy.
On the one hand, two-thirds of bankruptcy filers cite the
loss of a job or other source of income as the main reasons
for filing (Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook 1999). These
findings form the basis for the claim that unanticipated “trigger events” such as job loss, divorce, or health crises cause
bankruptcy. On the other hand, some researchers counter that
“strategic” behavior drives the decision to file for bankruptcy, as households continue to borrow and wait until the
benefit from filing is at a maximum before discharging their
debts. In their influential paper, Fay, Hurst, and White (2002)
analyze filing patterns in the PSID and argue that “discharge
of debt is the dominant consideration in households’ decisions to file” (p. 716).
The first paper shows that these two perspectives, rather
than being mutually exclusive, are both essential to understanding the personal bankruptcy decision. I develop a
dynamic, forward-looking model of household behavior
where the relationship between income shocks and the deci-
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sion to file for bankruptcy is explicit. The model implies that
strategic agents respond to adverse events optimally, both in
their borrowing patterns and in the likelihood and timing of
bankruptcy. Intuitively, the decision to file for bankruptcy is
irreversible and costly, and as such, there is an option value
to delaying (White 1998). Unanticipated shocks lead to asset
positions where filing is financially beneficial, while expectations about future earnings play an important role in both
the decision to file and the timing of when to file. The model
provides two key predictions: 1) the bankruptcy decision
crucially depends on both the magnitude and the expected
persistence of the income shock, and 2) job separations and
other income shocks can lead to lagged responses of bankruptcy filing.
I test these predictions using individual-level data from
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) and
county aggregate data collected from the U.S. Courts. The
effect of job loss on bankruptcy is estimated in the NLSY
using an event-study framework that carefully controls for
the timing of income shocks. Unlike previous research on
bankruptcy, the event-study methodology explicitly addresses the source of exogenous variation and allows for
estimation of preshock differences in bankruptcy likelihoods.
Using this approach, I find that households are four times as
likely to file for bankruptcy in the year immediately following a job displacement. Bankruptcy risk then declines in
magnitude but persists for two to three years. The persistence
of a higher bankruptcy risk after displacement is consistent
with the model, which formalizes the option value to delaying filing.
To explore further the implications of the model and to
test additional hypotheses raised by the “adverse events”
empirical literature, I investigate the impact of divorce
and health crises on the household bankruptcy decision.
In contrast to previous research, I find that divorce is not a
proximate cause of bankruptcy, as the likelihood of filing for
bankruptcy rises prior to divorce. I also find that the timing
of health shocks are highly related to the timing of bankruptcy. Overall, the evidence suggests that plausibly exogenous
job displacement and negative health shocks can play a role
in predicting future bankruptcies among those at-risk.
Although the NLSY is the best available panel data to
study bankruptcy, its small sample size does not yield the
statistical power necessary to distinguish the effects of job
loss based on the severity of the displacement or the demographics of the displaced. To examine these issues, I use
county-level data from the last three decades to estimate the
aggregate relationship between bankruptcy and job loss. This
independent analysis, using different data and a different empirical specification, yields similar results. I find that 1,000
additional job losses are associated with 8–11 bankruptcies,
and that the effects of job loss persist for two to three years,
consistent with the model and corroborating the individuallevel results using the NLSY.
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To examine the model’s prediction that more permanent income shocks are more likely to lead to bankruptcy, I
separate the county-level job losses into manufacturing and
nonmanufacturing jobs. Manufacturing jobs are generally
associated with longer tenure relationships and greater firmspecific human capital (Anderson and Meyer 1994; Topel
1990). Furthermore, losing a manufacturing job often leads
to deeper and more persistent earnings shortfalls (Carrington
1993). Consistent with the model’s predictions, I find that the
loss of a manufacturing job is three times more likely to lead
to bankruptcy than the loss of a nonmanufacturing job. This
is the first empirical evidence that the structural shift away
from the manufacturing sector has contributed to increases
in bankruptcy, and confirms that the micro foundations of the
dynamic model are supported by the macro patterns in the
data.
Separating the effects by county demographics and
macroeconomic conditions provides greater insight into
the consequences of job loss. I find that job losses are more
likely to lead to bankruptcies in counties that are more educated, wealthier, and have a larger fraction of working-age
individuals. These results suggest that job loss may be more
painful in these types of counties, with losses anticipated
to be more permanent, or representing greater destruction
of tenure and firm-specific human capital. Similarly, during
high-unemployment periods when unemployment durations
are expected to be significantly longer, the loss of 1,000
job leads to 40 more bankruptcies, while during low-unemployment periods the relationship is small and statistically
insignificant. These results provide robustness to the main
findings and offer an explanation for the cyclical patterns of
bankruptcy observed in the aggregate data.
These two complementary empirical analyses at the micro
and aggregate levels contribute to the literature on job loss
by providing strong evidence that the consequences of displacement extend into the credit market. In a similar context,
Sullivan (2008) finds that households increase their unsecured borrowing via credit cards in response to a short-term
earnings shock. Though unemployment spells are usually
brief, these short-term shocks can have larger long-term
consequences on a worker’s well-being. Recent research has
documented decreased long-term earnings and consumption,
greater marital discord, and even heightened mortality resulting from job losses (Browning and Crossley 2008; Charles
and Stephens 2004; Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan 1993;
Stephens 2001; Sullivan and von Wachter 2007).
The costs of bankruptcy are steep for the bankruptcy
courts, which review more than one million cases per year,
for all borrowers, who pay higher interest rates to compensate for the cost of discharged debts, and for the households
in jeopardy of default. Timely intervention on the part of
policymakers or the private sector potentially could reduce
the costs of bankruptcy. In 2005, a new provision to personal bankruptcy law was enacted that requires all debtors

20

to undergo credit counseling prior to filing for a discharge
of their debts. However, this feature of the new bankruptcy
code has not been successful in deterring filings, as clients
receive counseling only after contacting a bankruptcy lawyer.
A recent GAO report (GAO-07-203), appropriately titled
“Value of Credit Counseling Requirement Is Not Clear,”
supports the view that counseling would be more effective if
individuals with severe credit risks were identified at an earlier date: “Anecdotal evidence suggests that by the time most
consumers receive the pre-filing counseling, their financial
situations are dire, leaving them with no viable alternative to
bankruptcy.” Because the likelihood of filing for bankruptcy
is heightened in the years following a layoff, providing
credit counseling at the time of job displacement, or when an
individual exhausts Unemployment Insurance benefits, might
help some households avoid bankruptcy. It is not clear what
form a successful intervention would take, whether it would
require targeted extensions of credit, greater repayment flexibility, or forcing households to declare bankruptcy sooner
and thus avoid accumulating additional unsecured debt.
Designing feasible policy initiatives based on these results is
an important direction for future research.

Does Securitization Lead to Lax Screening?
Securitization, converting illiquid assets into liquid
securities, has grown tremendously in recent years, with the
securitized universe of mortgage loans reaching $3.6 trillion
in 2006. The option to sell loans to investors has transformed
the traditional role of financial intermediaries in the mortgage market from buying and holding to buying and selling.
The perceived benefits of this financial innovation, such as
improving risk sharing and reducing banks’ cost of capital, are widely cited (see, for example, Pennacchi [1988]).
However, delinquencies in the heavily securitized subprime
housing market increased by 50 percent from 2005 to 2007,
forcing many mortgage lenders out of business and setting
off a wave of financial crises that spread worldwide. In light
of the central role of the subprime mortgage market in the
current crisis, critiques of the securitization process have
gained increased prominence.
The rationale for concern over the originate-to-distribute
model during the crisis derives from theories of financial
intermediation. Delegating monitoring to a single lender
avoids the problems of duplication, coordination failure,
and free-rider problems associated with multiple lenders
(Diamond 1984). However, in order for a lender to screen
and monitor, it must be given appropriate incentives (Holmstrom and Tirole 1997), and this is provided by the illiquid
loans on their balance sheet (Diamond and Rajan 2003). By
creating distance between a loan’s originator and the bearer
of the loan’s default risk, securitization may have potentially
reduced lenders’ incentives to carefully screen and monitor
borrowers (Petersen and Rajan 2002). On the other hand,
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proponents of securitization argue reputation concerns, regulatory oversight, or sufficient balance sheet risk may have
prevented moral hazard on the part of lenders. What were the
effects of existing securitization practices on screening? This
remains an empirical question.
The second paper, co-authored with Tanmoy Mukherjee,
Amit Seru, and Vikrant Vig, investigates the relationship between securitization and screening standards in the context of
subprime mortgage loans. The challenge in making a causal
claim is the difficulty in isolating differences in loan outcomes independent of contract and borrower characteristics.
First, in any cross-section of loans, those that are securitized
may differ on observable and unobservable risk characteristics from loans kept on the balance sheet (not securitized).
Second, in a time-series framework, simply documenting a
correlation between securitization rates and defaults may be
insufficient. This inference relies on establishing the optimal
level of defaults at any given point in time. Moreover, this
approach ignores macroeconomic factors and policy initiatives that may be independent of lax screening and yet may
induce compositional differences in mortgage borrowers
over time. For instance, house price appreciation and the
changing role of government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs)
in the subprime market may also have accelerated the trend
toward originating mortgages to riskier borrowers in exchange for higher payments.
We overcome these challenges by exploiting a specific
rule of thumb in the lending market, which induces exogenous variation in the ease of securitization of a loan
compared to a loan with similar characteristics. This rule of
thumb is based on the summary measure of borrower credit
quality known as the Fair Isaac Company (FICO) score.
Since the mid-1990s, the FICO score has become the credit
indicator most widely used by lenders, rating agencies, and
investors. Underwriting guidelines established by the GSEs,
Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac, standardized purchases of
lenders’ mortgage loans. These guidelines cautioned against
lending to risky borrowers, the most prominent rule of thumb
being not lending to borrowers with FICO scores below 620
(Avery et al. 1996; ). While the GSEs actively securitized
loans when the nascent subprime market was relatively
small, since 2000 this role has shifted entirely to investment
banks and hedge funds (the nonagency sector). We argue
that persistent adherence to this ad-hoc cutoff by investors
who purchase securitized pools from nonagencies generates
a differential increase in the ease of securitization for loans.
That is, loans made to borrowers that fall just above the 620
credit cutoff have a higher unconditional likelihood of being
securitized and are therefore more liquid relative to loans
below this cutoff.
To evaluate the effect of securitization on screening decisions, we examine the performance of loans originated by
lenders around this threshold. As an example of our design,
consider two borrowers—one with a FICO score of 621
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(620+), the other with a score of 619 (620-)—who approach
the lender for a loan. In order to evaluate the quality of
the loan applicant, screening involves collecting both hard
information, such as the credit score, and soft information,
such as a measure of future income stability of the borrower.
Hard information, by definition, is something that is easy to
contract upon (and transmit), while the lender has to exert an
unobservable effort to collect soft information (Stein 2002).
We argue that the lender has a weaker incentive to base
origination decisions on both hard and soft information at
620+ where there is a higher likelihood that this loan will be
eventually securitized. In other words, because investors purchase securitized loans based on hard information, the cost
of collecting soft information is internalized by lenders to a
lesser extent when screening borrowers at 620+ than at 620-.
Therefore, by comparing the portfolio of loans on either side
of the credit score threshold, we can assess whether differential access to securitization led to changes in the behavior
of lenders who offered these loans to consumers with nearly
identical risk profiles.
Using a sample of more than one million home purchase
loans during the period 2001–2006, we empirically confirm
that the number of loans securitized varies systematically
around the 620 FICO cutoff. For loans with a potential for
significant soft information—low documentation loans—we
find that there are more than twice as many loans securitized
above the credit threshold at 620+ vs. below the threshold at
620-. Since the FICO score distribution in the population is
smooth (constructed from a logistic function), the underlying
creditworthiness and demand for mortgage loans (at a given
price) is the same for prospective buyers with a credit score
of either 620- or 620+. Therefore, these differences in the
number of loans confirm that the unconditional probability
of securitization is higher above the FICO threshold, i.e., it is
easier to securitize 620+ loans.
Strikingly, we find that while 620+ loans should be of
slightly better credit quality than those at 620-, low documentation loans that are originated above the credit threshold
tend to default within two years of origination at a rate 10–25
percent higher than the mean default rate of 5 percent (which
amounts to roughly a 0.5–1 percent increase in delinquencies). As this result is conditional on observable loan and
borrower characteristics, the only remaining difference
between the loans around the threshold is the increased ease
of securitization. Therefore, the greater default probability of
loans above the credit threshold must be due to a reduction in
screening by lenders.
Since our results are conditional on securitization, we
conduct additional analyses to address selection on the part
of borrowers, lenders, or investors as explanations for the
differences in the performance of loans around the credit
threshold. First, we rule out borrower selection on observables, as the loan terms and borrower characteristics are
smooth through the FICO score threshold. Next, selection
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of loans by investors is mitigated because the decisions of
investors (Special Purpose Vehicles, SPVs) are based on
the same (smooth through the threshold) loan and borrower
variables as in our data (Kornfeld 2007).
Finally, strategic adverse selection on the part of lenders may also be a concern. However, lenders offer the entire
pool of loans to investors, and, conditional on observables,
SPVs largely follow a randomized selection rule to create
bundles of loans out of these pools, suggesting securitized
loans would look similar to those that remain on the balance sheet (Gorton and Souleles 2005). Furthermore, if at all
present, this selection will tend to be more severe below the
threshold, thereby biasing the results against us finding any
screening effect. We also constrain our analysis to a subset of
lenders who are not susceptible to strategic securitization of
loans. The results for these lenders are qualitatively similar
to the findings using the full sample, highlighting that screening is the driving force behind our results.
Could the 620 threshold be set by lenders as an optimal
cutoff for screening that is unrelated to differential securitization? We investigate further using a natural experiment in
the passage and subsequent repeal of antipredatory laws in
New Jersey (2002) and Georgia (2003) that varied the ease
of securitization around the threshold. If lenders use 620 as
an optimal cutoff for screening unrelated to securitization,
we expect the passage of these laws to have no effect on the
differential screening standards around the threshold. However, if these laws affected the differential ease of securitization around the threshold, our hypothesis would predict an
impact on the screening standards. Our results confirm that
the discontinuity in the number of loans around the threshold
diminished during a period of strict enforcement of antipredatory lending laws. In addition, there was a rapid return
of a discontinuity after the law was revoked. Importantly, our
performance results follow the same pattern, i.e., screening
differentials attenuated only during the period of enforcement. Taken together, this evidence suggests that our results
are indeed related to differential securitization at the credit
threshold and that lenders did not follow the rule of thumb in
all instances. Importantly, the natural experiment also suggests that prime-influenced selection is not at play.
Once we have confirmed that lenders are screening more
rigorously at 620- than 620+, we assess whether borrowers
were aware of the differential screening around the threshold.
Although there is no difference in contract terms around the
cutoff, borrowers may have an incentive to manipulate their
credit scores in order to take advantage of differential screening around the threshold (consistent with our central claim).
Aside from outright fraud, it is difficult to strategically
manipulate one’s FICO score in a targeted manner, and any
actions to improve one’s score take relatively long periods of
time—about three to six months. Nonetheless, we investigate further using the same natural experiment evaluating
the performance effects over a relatively short time horizon.
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The results reveal a rapid return of a discontinuity in loan
performance around the 620 threshold, which suggests that
rather than manipulation, our results are largely driven by
differential screening on the part of lenders.
As a test of the role of soft information on screening
incentives of lenders, we investigate the full documentation
loan lending market. These loans have potentially significant
hard information because complete background information
about the borrower’s ability to repay is provided. In this market, we identify another credit cutoff, a FICO score of 600,
based on the advice of the three credit repositories. We find
that twice as many full documentation loans are securitized
above the credit threshold at 600+ vs. below the threshold at
600-. Interestingly, however, we find no significant difference in default rates of full documentation loans originated
around this credit threshold. This result suggests that despite
a difference in ease of securitization around the threshold,
differences in the returns to screening are attenuated due to
the presence of more hard information. Our findings for full
documentation loans suggest that the role of soft information
is crucial to understanding what worked and what did not in
the existing securitized subprime loan market.

Can Self-Control Explain Turning Down
Free Money?
The third paper, co-authored with Brian C. Cadena, uses
insights from behavioral economics to explain a particularly
bizarre borrowing phenomenon: About one in six undergraduate students who are offered interest-free loans turn them
down. The students we observe making these choices are not
atypical: Our sample consists of full-time students enrolled
at public or private nonprofit four-year institutions. Upon filling out the application required for all forms of need-based
aid, these students demonstrated sufficient financial need
to qualify for interest-free loans sponsored by the federal
government.
There are three principal reasons we should be surprised
that one-sixth of eligible students turn down the subsidized
loans that they are offered. First, these loans do not accrue
interest until six months after students leave school. These
interest payments represent a direct transfer to the student,
and the amount is nontrivial. If a student eligible for the
maximum in each year chose to accept the loan each year,
with an interest rate of four percent, the government subsidy
would be worth more than $1,500. The “free money” aspect
of below-market interest rates on student loans has long
been a part of conventional economic wisdom. One classic
undergraduate textbook explains the benefits of a $1,000
interest-free loan as follows: “You could at least take the
money and put it in a savings bank, where you will earn at
least 4 percent per year. Each year you can draw out the $40
interest and throw a big party. Finally . . . you can draw out
the $1,000, plus the last year’s interest; repay the $1,000; and
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have $40 for a last party” (Alchian and Allen 1964). We are
unaware, however, of any work that has tried to systematically understand why students do not take advantage of this
potential $1,500 “gift” from the government.
Seeing students turn down interest-free loans is also
surprising because government-sponsored loans help to make
increasingly expensive educational costs more affordable.
During a period when the return to higher education has
dramatically increased, the rising costs of an undergraduate
education have far outpaced the increase in the availability
of grants and scholarships (Avery and Hoxby 2003; Dynarski
2002;). In the absence of these programs, students would find
it costly to borrow against their future earnings due to informational asymmetries between students and private lenders.
The federal government has recognized this potential market
failure and offers students grants and loans through largescale programs, which provided $90 billion in total aid during the 2004–2005 school year. The Stafford Loan Program
was originally legislated through the Higher Education Act
of 1965 and has been awarded based on a straightforward
needs test since 1987. By rejecting their government-sponsored loans, students who choose to borrow are effectively
choosing to borrow at a significantly higher cost.
Finally, student aid offers are administered under the
presumption that students will accept all of their need-based
aid. Students must actively reduce or reject any amount they
do not wish to borrow. In fact, if a student has borrowed
before, she needs to do nothing at all to receive the full
amount of any subsidized loan awarded by her financial aid
office. As other researchers have shown, there is a significant
mental barrier to making decisions which deviate from the
default, known as “default bias” (see, for example, Choi et
al. [2003]). In the absence of competing forces, therefore,
students should rarely deviate from the default of accepting
all of their need-based aid, including interest-free loans.
While the benefits of subsidized student loans are seemingly unambiguous, borrowing does increase a student’s
short-term liquidity. As the quotation at the beginning of
this section suggests, interest-free loans are a double-edged
sword in the hands of an easily tempted consumer. Despite
the fact that these loans make it possible to smooth consumption over time, having such a large amount of liquidity can
lead to overspending, i.e., consuming more out of current
income than an agent with perfect willpower would desire.
We formalize this argument by modeling a college student
choosing how much to borrow while in school. We show that
a rational agent would not turn down interest-free student
loans because doing so requires foregoing a significant government subsidy in addition to limiting future liquidity. We
then discuss how rejecting the loan is consistent with models
of self-control from the theoretical literature that allow rational consumers to prefer a subset of choices to the complete
set. The debt-averse behavior we observe, therefore, may
be the optimal choice a forward-thinking student can make
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knowing that in the following period she will be tempted to
overspend.
There are, however, alternative reasons why a potential
borrower could make the “wrong” decision. Certainly some
students will reject the loan because they do not understand
how the subsidy works or do not analyze the decision closely
enough. Students may also falsely believe that borrowing
through student loan programs will hurt their credit score.
In fact, each month while the student is in school the lender
reports that the loan account is being paid as agreed, establishing a solid credit history. Apart from these information
problems, some students may reject their loans because of
the hassle that borrowing creates, such as having to keep
track of the documents associated with a loan or being required to make a payment each month after graduation. Still
others may reject the loans because they have acquired an
antidebt ethic such that indebtedness carries a psychological
cost. Because any of these factors can potentially explain the
significant fraction of students who turn down their interestfree loans, we cannot simply interpret high rejection rates as
evidence of a self-control motive.
To determine whether self-control plays an important role,
the ideal quasi-experimental setting would fix the benefits
of borrowing while varying students’ exposure to increased
liquidity. A feature of financial aid disbursement does exactly
this: Although the value of the subsidy is unchanged, needy
on-campus students have their loans automatically applied to
their educational expenses while similarly needy off-campus
students receive a portion of their aid in cash. Comparing the
take-up rates of these two groups provides us with a means
to test whether self-control motives are responsible for some
of the failure in take-up.
However, if students who reject their loans for other reasons tend to live in off-campus housing, this comparison may
incorrectly attribute differences in take-up rates to differences in liquidity. To address these selection concerns, we form
a difference-in-differences estimator, using students whose
liquidity is unaffected by their housing location as a counterfactual. For these students, any loan funds will be applied
directly to their tuition bill regardless of where they live.
Importantly, each member of the counterfactual group is also
eligible for the maximum subsidized loan. If students reject
their loans to avoid excess liquidity, the difference between
on- and off-campus rejection rates should be much larger for
the group who potentially receive their loans in cash.
Our estimates from the 1999–2000 and 2003–2004 waves
of the National Postsecondary Student Aid Study support a
self-control explanation: Students who would have received
cash from their loans turn down the subsidized loan seven
percentage points more frequently than similarly needy
students who live on-campus. Importantly, there is no significant difference in rejection rates across housing locations
for students who would not receive cash regardless of where
they live. These difference-in-differences results suggest that
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the increased liquidity created by living off-campus leads
students to reject their loans in higher numbers.
In further support of this hypothesis, we then isolate the
variation in living off-campus resulting from supply constraints at the school level. Specifically, we estimate the
effect of liquidity on take-up using the university’s dormitory
capacity (number of beds per student) as an instrument for
the housing location decision. To maintain the advantages
of the difference-in-differences framework, we also instrument for the interaction of location and loans in excess of
tuition, which determines whether the loan is distributed in
cash. This exactly identified IV specification (two endogenous regressors and two instruments) thus continues to
compare the on/off-campus differences in take-up between
students whose loans pay only tuition and students whose
loans also pay room and board. In contrast to the OLS results
that potentially suffer from endogenous selection into on- or
off-campus housing, the IV results isolate the variation in
housing location and exposure to liquidity that derives from
differences in the supply of on-campus housing units. The IV
results complement the earlier findings, again demonstrating
a differential willingness to borrow across housing locations,
even when controlling for differences in school quality that
are correlated with housing capacity. These sets of results are
difficult to explain without self-control concerns affecting
students’ decisions.
These findings provide evidence that consumers choose
to limit their available choices in a natural setting, i.e., one
not generated by the researcher. While several laboratory
and simulation studies have presented evidence consistent
with consumers exercising self-control (for example, Ariely
and Wertenbroch 2002), studies using data and situations not
generated by the researcher have tended to find evidence of
consumers succumbing to the temptation of earlier consumption (DellaVigna and Malmendier 2006; Shapiro 2005, ). In
addition, while most field experiments are explicitly designed to hold constant any differences between two choices
except for the level of commitment, our results reveal that
some consumers are willing to pay a substantial amount of
money in order restrict their future decisions. These two
features distinguish this study as particularly compelling evidence for the existence and importance of time-inconsistent
preferences.
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